Was the Rajiv-Longowal Accord a betrayal or a lost opportunity?

The claim: The Accord was a lost opportunity, not a betrayal by Delhi, and its negotiators blame Akali rivals for the loss. Arjun Singh, Rajiv Gandhi's go-between and Governor of Punjab, told The Tribune in 2010 that Parkash Singh Badal's lack of cooperation "was in substance the tragedy of the Accord". Surjit Singh Barnala told the same paper that messengers sent to Badal and Gurcharan Singh Tohra before Longowal met Rajiv Gandhi got no reply. The Tribune's Kamlendra Kanwar credits its goodwill steps (releases of Sikhs jailed after Operation Blue Star, eased censorship, a judicial inquiry into November 1984) with helping restore normalcy, but calls it a "virtual non-starter" once Longowal was killed. UPI reported that Sikh gunmen killed him, angered by the Accord.

The sourced facts:

• Signed on 24 July 1985. Clause 3 extended the Misra Commission to Bokaro and Kanpur. Clause 7 gave Chandigarh to Punjab on 26 January 1986, with a commission to name Hindi-speaking areas for Haryana. Clause 8 sent the Anandpur Sahib Resolution's Centre-State parts to the Sarkaria Commission. Clause 9.3 read: "The construction of SYL Canal shall continue. The Canal shall be completed by August 15, 1986" (AllAboutSikhs; Ministry of Jal Shakti).
• The Akali Dal won 73 of 117 seats on 25 September 1985 and Barnala took office (UPI).
• Chandigarh did not move. Rajiv Gandhi "backed out at the eleventh hour" after a Haryana demonstration led by Devi Lal; the Mathew Commission found 83 Hindi-speaking villages but not contiguous, the Venkataramiah Commission proposed 70,000 acres, and Punjab rejected the Desai Commission (The Tribune, 2024). K.B.S. Sidhu, a retired Special Chief Secretary of Punjab, writes: "That Republic Day midnight came and went with nothing done."
• The Eradi Tribunal reported in January 1987 shares of 5.00 million acre-feet for Punjab and 3.83 for Haryana, and clarification requests are still pending (The Tribune, 2025). The Tribune says the November 1984 inquiry stayed with the Misra Commission (2010) and that "most of these promises were never implemented" (2024). Barnala remained Chief Minister until 11 May 1987 (PTI, in The Tribune).
• Sidhu argues the Accord was "never converted into binding law by either party" and that Punjab gave up the canal, "its only material bargaining chip", and received none of what it was promised.

The Panthic answer: The Panth's assembly of 1986 called it a betrayal and named the Sikh signatories. The Sarbat Khalsa at Sri Akal Takht Sahib on 26 January 1986, called by the Damdami Taksal, rejected the Longowal-Rajiv accord as a breach of trust with the Sikhs that came nowhere near the Anandpur Sahib Resolution. It named Longowal, Tohra, Badal, Barnala and others as chief culprits for breaking oaths not to settle for less, declared them traitors (gaddar) to the Sikh qaum, and pledged to foil every attempt to take Punjab's water through the Sutlej-Yamuna link (Panthic Dastavez, pp. 162 to 163). Badal's own account differs: The Tribune says he and Tohra had doubts from the start, and he told it, "We had forewarned Sant Longowal. Our apprehensions that he would be cheated into the Accord have ultimately come true."

Bhai Ajmer Singh argues that the Accord came from a deliberate change of personnel at the Centre. After 1984, he says, Delhi decided by March 1985 to settle and pacify Punjab, and first replaced the Home Secretary, who had been brought in to crush. R.D. Pradhan was pulled out of Maharashtra and Arjun Singh was told to resign as Madhya Pradesh Chief Minister and go to Punjab. To crush, the Centre sends brutal men; to make peace, shrewd and capable minds. The Accord came, he says, after it had kept in jail the same men whose signatures it then needed, and if we cannot understand these twists, he asks, how will we advance our own politics? He names Longowal, Badal, Barnala and Tohra among the leaders of that era of whom he says flatly: that is gaddari, and nothing else can be said. In Vihveen Sadi Di Sikh Rajneeti (chs. 17 to 19) he judges Longowal's leadership by what it failed to do: the Dharam Yudh Morcha's main gain went to Bhindranwale, and parallel negotiations with the Centre went on.