Did the Akali leadership invite or accept the army action of June 1984?

The claim: Three versions are heard. A Council of Khalistan statement entered in the US Congressional Record by Rep. Edolphus Towns on 23 May 2007 says "it was this Akali party and this Akali leadership of Badal, Tohra, and Longowal who invited the Indian army into the Golden Temple". Bhai Mokham Singh, for over a decade a spokesperson of the Damdami Taksal, told The Caravan in 2014 that the Akalis "were tacitly involved in the attack on the Darbar Sahib" because they "figured that if Sant Bhindranwale came out alive he would be finished". Capt Amarinder Singh told The Tribune on 24 January 2017 that the late Parkash Singh Badal "was even aware of the date" and "had given a sort of green signal to the Centre". The state's own version is that the Akalis gave up: Brig D. V. Rao's affidavit, which The Tribune headlined "Says Longowal surrendered" on 20 March 2007, says a unit commander was told that Longowal and colleagues "were willing to surrender".

The sourced facts:

• Talks did happen. The Tribune (1 June 2014) reports that Akali leaders were taken out of jail and flown to Delhi for secret talks, the last on 26 May according to retired IPS officer M. P. S. Aulakh. Pranab Mukherjee's memoir says they met him at the Chandigarh airport lounge a few days before the operation and that "the talks remained unsuccessful"; as reported by IANS, he blames the Akali Dal's rigid stance. No source above records an Akali leader asking for the Army.
• The Akali leaders wanted Bhindranwale out of the morcha, not the Army in. SikhRI says that, urged by Longowal and the Akali Dal, the Babbar Khalsa demanded on 15 December 1983 that he leave Guru Nanak Niwas. Guha says the Akalis had failed to persuade him to leave the temple, and that Longowal had announced a grain-stopping movement from 3 June.
• A warning in 1983. The Tribune (15 July 2002) reports a former Amritsar Deputy Commissioner, Sarbjit Singh, writing in his book Black Thunder, from a conversation with Tohra in 1988, that Rajiv Gandhi had let slip in 1983 that the Congress might send the Army into the Golden Temple to please Hindu voters, that Tohra protested to Rajiv and to Indira Gandhi, and that Indira assured him it would never happen. Tohra's confidant Manjit Singh Calcutta called this "an official version".
• Inside the complex. Longowal, Tohra and Balwant Singh Ramoowalia were secured in a room and taken out in an armoured vehicle on the afternoon of 6 June (The Tribune, 2014). On 2 June Longowal, Tohra and Jathedar Giani Kirpal Singh met after the firing of 1 June, and the Jathedar and the Head Granthi appealed to the Panth to protect Darbar Sahib.
• The surrender charge. Apar Singh Bajwa, then DSP City, said there was "not an iota of truth" in the allegation that Longowal, Tohra and other leaders surrendered; they were surrounded by troops and put into Army trucks (The Tribune, 20 May 2001). Calcutta called the White Paper's surrender charge "a bundle of lies" and said they were taken from a room in the Teja Singh Samundri Hall with about 40 other leaders (15 July 2002). Neither version says the Akalis invited the Army.

The Panthic answer: Sikh institutions place the decision with the Prime Minister and her government. The Encyclopaedia of Sikhism's entry on Longowal says "the army was ordered by the prime minister into the Golden Temple premises". Marking the 40th anniversary on 6 June 2024, Jathedar Giani Raghbir Singh spoke of the third Ghallughara and SGPC president Dhami asked the government to apologise in Parliament (SGPC). SikhRI notes that Longowal, Tohra, Badal and Barnala made the same ardas at Akal Takht Sahib as Bhindranwale, vowing not to end the Dharam Yudh Morcha until its aims were met. Sikh opinion of the Akali leadership itself is divided: Mokham Singh and the Council of Khalistan attack it, while The Tribune (20 August 2024) notes that some hailed Longowal as a voice of moderation and Akali contemporaries accused him of "double-play".

Bhai Ajmer Singh names Parkash Singh Badal, Surjit Singh Barnala, Tohra and Longowal among the leaders of 1984 of whom he says flatly that what they did was gaddari, betrayal, and that nothing else can be said about them; he dismisses the excuse that they never claimed they would fight. In Vihveen Sadi Di Sikh Rajneeti he judges Longowal's leadership by what it failed to do: the talks with Indira Gandhi in 1981 and 1982 produced nothing, and it was divided among its leaders, a division the Centre could use. He also corrects a charge against Tohra: the letter about action against the Akal Takht attributed to him was, he says, by another Gurcharan Singh, secretary of the Akali Dal under Longowal.